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THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
By THOMAS J. O'NEIL
"Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other
State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the
manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall
be proved and the Effect thereof." (Art. 4, Sec. 1, of the Federal
Constitution.)
This section, as well as most other sections of the Con-
stitution, has invoked varying opinions evidenced by conflicting
decisions as to the interpretation to be placed on this particular
section of the Constitution.
In order to understand the nature and effect of the full
faith- and credit clause, it is necessary that one consider the
history as to this section immediately preceding and following
the adoption and ratification of the Federal Congtitution.
Prior to the adoption of the "Articles of Confederation" by
the colonies, the courts of each colony, in the absence of a statute
providing otherwise, regarded the judgments of the courts of
the other colonies as foreign judgments, and so only prima facie
evidence of the matter adjudged. Therefore such judgments
could be re-examined on their merits in the colony in which they
were sued on. When "The Articles of Confederation" were
adopted, the framers of those historical articles realized that
the judgments of each colony must be allowed greater force in
the other colonies, so the following clause was introduced in
the Articles, "Full faith and credit shall be given in each of
these states to the records, acts, and judicial proceedings of
the courts and magistrates of every 'other State." As the Ar-
ticles did not provide for the authenticationof the records, acts,
and judicial proceedings, the framers of the Federal Constitution
inserted the following clause, "Congress may by general laws,
prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceed-
ings shall be proved." Pursuant to this power the first Congress
in 1790 passed an act providing for the method of authentication,
and in 1804 another act was passed.
THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER
The question of the effect of the constitutional provision
and of the acts enacted pursuant to it, caused much conflict
of opinion. Many of the courts in deciding cases involving the
question held that the clause and acts were merely intended to
provide a means of authentication and proof of records and ju-
dicial proceedings of thq other states, and so did not intend to
confer on the judgments of other states any greater rights than
they were accorded at common law, and consequently, such
judgments were not conclusive but prima facie evidence of the
matter adjudged.'
In 1813 the United States Supreme Court decided- that the
judgment of a State court was to be conclusive in a sister state
providing the court which rendered the decision had jurisdiction
of the person of the defendent and of the subject matter and
the judgment was otherwise valid.' Therefore any judgment
rendered by a court having no jurisdiction of the person or of
the subject matter or both may be impeached in another state
for the. lack of such jurisdiction.4 So in order to render a judg-
ment in personam which will be entitled to full faith and credit, -
the court making the decision must have jurisdiction over the
person of the defendent by means of personal service within its
limits or by the voluntary appearance of the defendant.5 It is
only when the property of a non-resident or absent defendant
is brought under the control of the court before the time of the
action or where his assent to a different mode of service is given
in advance that the court has the jurisdiction to impose a decree
in personam against him without personal service of process
on him or his voluntary appearance in the action.6 It is gener-
ally held that when a resident is temporarily absent from the
state, substituted service, as required by statute may be had on
the defendant to entitle the decree to full faith and credit. 7 The
United States Supreme Court, though it has not expressed a
definite opinion, has intimated that such service may be valid,
1 Peck V. Williamson, 10,896 Fed. Cas.
2 Mills V. Duryee, 7 Cranch 481.
s Thompson V. Whitman, 21 Led. 879.
4 Thompson V. Whitman, supra; Christmas V. Russel. 18 Led. 475.
5 Settlemier V. Sullivan 97 U. S. 444.
6 Pennoyer V. Neff, 95 U. S. t14; Thompson V. Thompson, 226 U. S. 551.
7 Huntley V. Baker, 33 Hun. (N. Y.) 578; Sturgis V. Fay, 16 Ind. 429.
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when served in the manner required by statute on a resident
temporarily without the state.8
Three conditions are necessary to give a court jurisdiction
in personam over a foreign corporation to entitle such decree
to full faith and credit. First ,it must appear that the corporation
was engaged in business in the state where the process was
served on its agent; second, that the business was transacted by
an agent or officer appointed by or representing the corporation
in that state, third, the existence of some local law making such
corporation amenable to suit there as a condition express or
implied of doing business in the state.?
The constitutional provision as to full faith and credit is a
rule of evidence only and does not require that an action shall be
allowed on such judgments regardless of other objections to its
maintenance. 0
The new York Code denies the use of the state courts in
cases. between foreign corporations where the cause of action
arises outside the state, even though the cause of action is a judg-
ment obtained in another state. In the Anglo-American Pro-
vision Co. v. Davis Provision Co." the United States Supreme
Court. held that the Code provision did not violate the full faith
and credit clause on the ground that the state did not have to
provide a court in vwhich to bring the action, that is was only
after a suit had been brought in the state court that the parties
could claim the protection of the full faith and ccredit clause.
It has been held that a judgment of a sister state cannot be
impeached on the ground of fraud.', North Carolina has held
that though the judgment cannot be impeached at law on the
ground of fraud, yet in equity proof of the fraud would bar an
action on the judgment.- However, it is now generally held that
the provision does not prevent the attacking of a judgment of a
sister state on the grouds of manifest fraud.14
A judgment enforceable in the State where rendered must
be given effect in another State under this clause, although the
a McDonald V. Mabee, 243 U. S. 90.
9 Ill. Statutes, Chap. 32, Par. 87; K~ane V. New Jersey, 246 U. S. 160;
International Harvester Co. V. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 679.
io Wisconsin V. Pelican Ins.C o., 127 U. S. 265; also see Huntington V.
AtAtrill, 146 U. S. 657.
41 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 92.
z2 Christmas V. Russel, 18 Led. 475.
18 55 S. E. 371.
z4 American Expr. Co. V. Mullins, 212 U. S. 311..
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modes of procedure to enforce its collection may not be the same
in both. States.15 In Fauntleroy v. Lum16 an aciton was brought
in Mississippi on a judgment recovered in Missouri. The original
cause of action arose in Mississippi out of a transaction which
was illegal and void in Mississippi but valid in "Missouri where
the plaintiff recovered judgment while the defendant was tem-
porarly in that State. On appeal to the United State Supreme
Court it was held that "records and judicial proceedings shall
have such faith and credit given to them as they. have by law
or usage in the courts of the State whence the said records are
or shall be taken, and the validity of the action having been
determined in Missouri that decision was conclusive on that
question." It seems almost impossible to reconcile the above de-
cision with other Supreme Court decisions which have held that
a State does not have to give full faith and credit to the judg-
ment rendered in a sister State when it is contrary to the laws
or public policy of the State where sued on.17
The duty to give full force and effect to the Constitution of
a State is as obligatory as the similar duty in respect to judicial
proceedings of that State.18
A judgment in rem pronouced by a court having jurisdiction
determines the status of the thing adjudgeg against all the
world.1 .9 The probate of a will is a proceeding in rem and the
judgment of the Court thereon is conclusive.2 0 However, it must
be understood that judgments in actions in rem as well as judg-
ments in actions in personam can be impeached on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction.2 1
The full faith and credit to be given to divorce cases has
led to such innumerable and conflicting decisions which at one
time produced an almost chaotic condition. This phase has not
as yet reached the point of stability which is necessary for
perfect law, but from the many and varied decisions there have
evolved several principles which have been enforced more or less
strictly. Much of the uncertainty regarding the effect to be
15 Sistare V. Sistare, 218 U. S. 1.
16 210 U. S. 230.
17 Finney V. Guy, 189 U. S. 340; Andrews V. Andrews, 188 U. S. 14.
1 Smithsonian Institute V. St. John, 214 U. S. 19.
19 Dadue's Syndics V. Nicholson A La. 81.
20 HI-anrock Nat. Bank V. Farnum, 176 U. S. 640, 2 Black, Judgments
Secs. 635-38.
21 Andrews V. Andrews, 188 U. S. 14.
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given to divorce decrees has been removed by extending the rules
of comity between the various states. The leading case on this
question is Haddock v. Haddock,22 and the principles of that case
have been upheld. In that case it was decided that a decree of di-
vorce will be entitled to full faith and credit only where the
parties have a bona fide domicile in the State in which the action
is brought and the defendant is personally served with the
process, or where one party has a bona fide domicile in a State
and obtains personal service of process on the defendant while
that party is within the Staet, or where the divorce is granted
in the State of the matrimonial domicile which is also the domi-
cile of the innocent party and where notice by publication is given
to the other party if his residence is unknown or he is outside
,the jurisdiction of the court. Under this view the question as
to what constitutes the matrimonial domicile has led to much
difference of opinion. There are two theories as to where that
domicile exists, some courts holding that it is the State in which
the parties were married, and other courts holding that it is the
State in which the parties last lived together as man and wife.
As far as the writer knows there is one question regarding the
matrimonial domicile which as yet has never been adjudicated.
That is where A marries B in New York and they then become
domiciled in Indiana. A is guilty of some fault which constitutes
a ground for divorce, and thereupon becomes domiciled in
Illinois, while B becomes domiciled in Ohio and there sues for
a divorce and gives notice by publication to A and secures a
divorce. Is such divorce entitled t6 full faith and credit? Does
the matrimonial domicile follow the innocent party? A state-
ment is made in the Harvard Law Review in discussing the case
of Haddock v. Haddock that the matrimonial domicile does follow
the innocent party, but no citations are given to substantiate this
theory. The Haddock case has been compared and contrasted
with Atherton v. Atherton.2 3 These cases though not in strict
accordance are not irreconcilable. In the Atherton case the
husband secured a divorce in Kentucky where the parties last re-
sided as man and wife on notice by publication to the wife who
was at that time domiciled in New York. The wife then sued
2 201 U. S. 562.
23 181 U. S. 155.
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in New York for a divorce and the husband appeared and pleaded
the Kentucky decree. The Supreme Court of the United States
held that the divorce having been obtainedfin the State where the
matrimonial domicile existed, and the Kentucky court having
found that the husband was the innocent party, that the question
as to who was the innocent party was conclusively settled by
±hat court, and the Kentucky decree entitled to full faith and
credit in New York.
There have been three varied lines of decisions as to the
effect of divorce decrees. Some courts hold that the divorce affects
the status of the parties and so the proceeding is one in rem
and where the court acquires jurisdiction over the res, namely,
the marriage relationship, the decree, if valid, where rendered,
is valid everywhere, eiren in the absence of actual notice to, or
appearance on the part of the defendant.2 4 Another line of cases
hold-that the divorce proceeding is in personam, and the decree
not binding on a defendant domiciled outside the jurisdiction of
the court, when there can be no personal service on him and he
does not appear.25 Then there are courts which decide that the
divorce proceeding is quasi in rem. These courts hold that per-
sonal service on a non-resident defendant or appearance by him
is not absolutely necessary in order that a divorce may be bind-
ing in another State, but they require that the best possible no-
tice be given.2 6
As a general proposition it may be stated that a domicile
of some sort, within the State granting the divorce, is necessary
to give jurisdiction to that court.2 7
Another interesting question which arises under the full faith
and credit clause is the finality of the judgment rendered in the sis-
ter State. It is well settled that this clause applies only to judg-
ments which are final, and does not apply to those which are
interlocutory, intermediate, or which can be changed at will by
the court granting the decree.28 The effect to be given to decrees
for alimony has provided most of the controversy under this
phase of the full faith and credit clause. If the decree provides
24 In Re Jones' Estate, 33 Pac. 1122 (Cal.); Chiever V. Wilson, 76-tU. S.
108.
25 People V. Baker, 76 N. Y. 78.
26 Thomas V. King, 61 S. W. 983 (Tenn.); Burlen V. Shannon, 115 Mass.
438.
27 Bell V. Bell, 181 U. S. 175.
28 177 Fed. 994, 110 Pac. 756 (Okla.); 263 S. W., 22 (Ky.).
THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER
for a fixed and certain sum, the judgment is entitled to full faith
and credit, but if that sum may be increased, decreased, or an-
nulled by the court granting the judgment for alimony, then the
judgment is not final and not entitled to full faith and credit.29
When the decree of the sister state provides for the payment of
alimony in certain fixed installments, all installments due, when
the action is brought in the other state, are final and entitled to
full faith and credit, providing the court which granted the
judgment does not have the power to change that judgment
regarding the installments already due, though it may have the
right to change those which shall thereafter become due.30
As. has been stated before, in order to render a judgment
which will be entitled to full faith and credit in other states,
it is essential that the court granting the judgment have juris-
diction over the subject matter. This proposition, therefore,
brings up the question of the effect to be given to equitable de-
crees rendered in a state in which the land is not situated and
affecting the title or interest in that land, and also as regards di-
vorce decrees awarding land situated in another state to one of
the parties. It is an elementary principle of law that all right,
title, and interest in realty can be determined only by the state
in which the real estate is situated.1 Therefore a decision in
rem, such as one declaring void a deed of land in another state,
is of no effect whatever, since the court lacks jurisdiction over
the land. 2 Where a court of equity has jurisdiction over both
parties it can compel the defendant to make a deed to land in
another state, and such deed will be recognized in the state in
which the land is situated, and such judgment is entitled to full
faith and credit,3 but if in such a case the defendant refuses
to make the deed and gets beyond the jurisdiction of the court
so that he cannot be compelled to make one, a deed made by the
entitled to full faith and credit.4 The same rules have been
adopted where the action is one of divorce instead of an action
commissioner of the equity court pursuant to the decree is not
29 148 Fed. 576; 195 Ill. Appl. 350; 190 N. Y. S. 369.
so Sistare V. Sistare, 218 U. S. 1; 190 N. W. 542 (Minn.); 202 P. 211
(Utah).
31 U. S. V. Crosby. 3 L. ed. 287.
32 Carpenter V. Strange, 141 U. S. 87.
3s Burnley V. Stephenson, 24 Ohio St. 174
34 Burnley V. Stephenson, supra; Fall V. Ehistin, 215 U. s. 1.
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in equity. 5 In Matson v. Matson 6 a divorce was rendered in
Washington, both parties being present, and the defendant was
ordered to convey to the plaintiff land in Iowa. The defendant
refused to convey the land, and went to Iowa and fraudulently
sold the land to a party having knowledge of the Washington
judgment for practically no consideration. The plaintiff in the
Washington suit brought action in an Iowa court to set the
cbnveyance aside, obtaining jurisdiction of her former husband
and of the person who purchased from him. The Iowa court held
that the Washington decree did not, of itself, operate to transfer
the land to the plaintiff, but that the decree was sufficient and
proper basis for the action brought in Iowa.
It has. been held that the courts of one state having juris-
diction over the person of the defendant can enjoin him from
bringing or prosecuting an action in another state, and such
injunction is entitled to full faith and credit in the other statds. 7
By the better view the full faith and credit clause does not de-
mand that the courts of other states give the doctrines of a sister
state extraterritorial effecf.3 7
The full faith and credit clause does not extend to judg-
ments, acts, and judicial proceedings of a foreign country or
state3 9 The effect which shall be given to such foreign judg-
ments, acts, and judicial proceedings is determined by treaties
of the United States with the foreign country or state or by the
international principles of comity. In Hilton v. Guyot 0 a suit
was brought in a New York court on 'a judgment recovered
against Americans in France. On appeal the United States Su-
preme Court held that since France considered the judgments
rendered in the United States as only prima facie evidence of
the matter adjudicated, the United States also were only bound
to consider a judgment rendered in France as prima facie evi-
dence. In some states foreign judgments have been given con-
clusive effect."1
35 Fall -V. Eastin, supra; Bullock V. Bullock, 52 N. 3. Eq. 561.
36 186 Ia. 607.
37 Cole V. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107.
38 Shelton V. Johnson, 4 Sneed (Tenn.) 467.
39 Aetna Life Ins. Co. V. Trembley, 223 U. S. 185.
40 159 U. S. 113.
41 Eastern Township Bank V. Beebe & Bo., 53 Vt. 177; McDonald V.
Grand Trunk R.R. Co., 71 N. HI. 448.
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Decisions of the federal courts are entitled to full faith
and credit in state courts, not because of the section of the Fed-
eral Constitution, but because of the Acts which have been
adopted pursuant to it.42 Likewise decisions of state courts are
entitled to full faith and credit in the federal courts.43
A judgment founded on a strictly penal statute or one which
is penal of fiscal in the internation sense is not entitled to full
faith and credit in another state.44 The question whether a
statute of one state which is in some aspects penal, is penal in
the international sense so that it cannot be enforced in another
state depends on the question whether its .purpose is to punish
an offense against the public justice of the stateor to afford a
private remedy to a person injured by- the act. If it is.the latter
then it is not penal in the international sense, and a judgment
validly rendered thereon, is entitled -to full faith and credit in
the other states.4
42 Metcalf V. Watertown, 153 U. S. 671; Crescent Live Stock Co. V.
Butchers' Union, 120 U. S. 141.
43 Swift V. McPherson, 232 U. S. 51; U. S. V. Mason, 213 U. S. 115;
Cooper V. Newell 173 U. S. 567.
44 Wisconsin V. Pelican Ins. Co.. 127 U. S. 266; Huntington V. Attril,
146 U. S. 657; Great Western Mach. Co. V. Smith, 87 Kan. 331.
4s 103 U. S. 11, Huntington Y. Attrill, supra.
